Propositions
Posted by LaudateAgno on 2025-January-3 20:58:33, FridayIn reply to Re: No, that's not my argument posted by diogenes on 2025-January-3 13:02:32, Friday
|
My point is that the distinction the functionalist (or any physicalist, I suspect) will make between the difference between the truth-value of p and the truth-value of "I believe p" doesn't get one out of the problem. Mathematical truths, about triangles or anything else, simply cannot be had by looking at any physical system. Looking at a brain-state can (in principle) tell us only about the truth-value of "I believe p," not of p itself. But nothing else in the physical world can either. There must be something about p which is "real" and has a truth-value, but there's nothing in the physical world corresponding to p. Thus there exist non-physical entities, and physicalism is false. Yes, this is a Platonic sort of conclusion. A shame your tastes do not embrace DBH, but if he can't convince you, I'll have to keep trying myself! |
Follow ups: