Re: Mind's place in nature

The purpose of my OP was to define physicalism with a little more precision, to show its internal logical coherence, as well as its being consistent with our notions of rational agency and moral responsibility, and to rebut LA's criticisms; en passant suggesting that the notion of “free will”, which no one seems interested in defining or giving any precision to, is a muddle-headed nonsense that is incompatible with moral agency. Your post raises the quite different issue of justification – which is great. But both your criticisms assume that I was advancing physicalism as an empirical hypothesis, whereas I was in fact advancing it as a philosophical thesis. The two are quite distinct and are justified in quite different ways (as you will know from reading Parfit), unless you take the view (which Stephen Hawking took) that philosophy is dispensable and that science is completely self-explanatory. I should add that ever since Hume it has been known that science itself rests upon a tissue of tacit metaphysical assumptions about the nature of things. It is therefore impossible to dispense with philosophy. Your own beliefs admit something other than science. You are (I suppose) a Buddhist (or something). I very much doubt that such dogmata as reincarnation and karma are either scientifically provable or disprovable; so it seems that you are willing to entertain beliefs on other grounds than that they are a scientific hypothesis; and I believe you are perfectly within your rights to do so. So, having admitted that philosophical propositions are admissible, even though they do not function in the same way as empirical hypotheses, your two criticisms are essentially irrelevant. To take your second point first, the fact that physicalism cannot be falsified is neither here not there. Unless you subscribe to a particularly strict form of positivism (which I personally do not, and neither can you given your other beliefs), a proposition can be true or false even if it is not verifiable (or falsifiable). To suppose otherwise is to subscribe to the Protagorean view that Man is the measure of all things, and that whatever is beyond our observational capacities cannot exist. And, to take your first point, the fact that I cannot empirically prove the physicalist thesis is neither here nor there either. The thesis does not rest on any prophecy about the current or future state of science. Of course we cannot predict the operations of the brain, because the brain is inconceivably more elaborate than a computer. But physicalism is certainly consistent with our current knowledge of neuroscience. Indeed, I warrant that the vast majority of neuroscientists are physicalists. “What is the value of hypothesizing physicalism if it does not enable any useful predictions.” Its value lies in its being true (if it is true), not in making “useful” predictions. I am putting it forward in an attempt to understand the world, not because of its utility. What is the practical utility of Berkeley's theory? Probably nil. What usefulness is there in Duns Scotus' theory of universals? Nothing whatever, I imagine, but it is still a theory that must be taken seriously by all those who seek philosophical truth. As for the justification of physicalism, I'm afraid that my answer to that may strike you as unsatisfactory. To me, it just seems ridiculous to suppose that the laws of physics apply rigidly to all matter everywhere in the universe except in human craniums. I happen to agree with Hume and Cicero and Epicurus and any number of ancient and modern authors that nothing happens outside the natural order. I don't believe in the possibility of miracles; I believe that everything is under rigid law and everything belongs to the same undivided totality that is nature. Supernatural interlopers are not required to explain the phenomena, and I find it intellectually simpler and cleaner to dispense with them. It is the same with beneficent creator gods. Various theodicies have been invented to explain how a supposedly kindly god could make a universe with revolting diseases for children. These theodicies have never struck me as plausible, but I'm not sure I can “refute” them either. However, it just seems to me simpler to do without the god altogether and then one can dispense with the theodicy. Likewise, I cannot prove physicalism. But it just seems to me a great deal simpler and more straightforward and plausible than the idea of a universe in which physical laws apply everywhere except in a tiny corner, where they are constantly suspended, just so that humans can think of themselves as special. And that, however unsatisfactory, is all I can say. Thank you very much indeed for your response!